moral theology which century after century had included not a few theologies centered on virtue.
Some advocates of virtue ethics adopted the posture of discovery and originality. But for Catholics this discovery occurred as the ethics of virtue was completing a cycle of influence within Catholic moral theology; any claim of a restoration of an ethics of virtues overlooks the many presentations on virtues in Catholic moral theology from 1860 to 1960 (or from 1560 to 1860) in numerous neo-Scholastic journals and multivolume moral treatises. If influential Catholic moral theology texts such as those by Arthur Vermeersch, Heribert Jone, and Aloysius Sabetti took an approach drawn from the commandments, nevertheless not only manuals but also catechisms and devotional books often treated virtues. Recent summonses to an Aristotelian-Scholastic ethics have been accompanied at times by a monitory tone: modernity is evil, and Catholicism is slipping into a modern abyss by setting aside its Baroque seminary form of moral theology. For enthusiasts of these ethics of virtue it must have been disappointing that the wide world of Roman Catholicism did not join immediately and universally in this renewed discussion of virtues. But that could hardly have been expected: something from the past can be represented in a new form, but the course of history never repeats itself, nor does it go backwards. Some contemporary ethicians and philosophers cite Aquinas without seeing if his theology supports their interpretation. Stanley Hauerwas originally presented an ethics where virtues described in Aristotelian language were linked to biblical phrases and the imitation of Christ, or where "natural virtues" were changed by the character of a story, virtue a naturalist or Pelagian tone, as in Paul Waddell's view: "Happiness is lasting intimacy with God, but it is a kinship possible only when we are enough like God in goodness to have union with God. This is what the virtues help achieve, the ongoing, penetrating remaking of ourself through habits that make us godly. We need to develop the virtues because godliness does not come naturally to us, nor does it come easy." 12 The activities of acquired virtues, however, are for Aquinas infinitely distant from divinization in virtue by the Spirit. Jean Porter's recovery of virtue suggests Aquinas's "unified theory of morality as an option for contemporary Christian ethics. 13 Porter's work is more Thomist and more theological: she mentions the interplay between the natural and the supernatural, and a special goal "bestowed on us only through a supernatural transformation of our capacities for knowledge and love, which begins in this life through grace." 14 Her opening chapters on "a general theory of goodness" focus on the goodness of creation and on the human individual and social good but note "the fact that we are actually directed toward a supernatural end." 15 The central chapters on virtues, however, do not locate them within Aquinas's theology. Grace's role is mentioned but left imprecise ("transforming," "uniting") in its relationship to habits and actions, and in its place charity is claimed to be "the supreme organizing principle." 16 The relationship of the supernatural to the natural, and the nature of all the infused virtues are not explored. A further essay shows that the theology of Aquinas interests Porter, but her queries about the dualism of nature and grace lead her away from further considerations of Aquinas's theological framework. 17 Porter asks whether the "ecclesiastically sanctioned language of supernatural grace" might be dropped or partly ignored, but she does not mention which of the dozens of theologies of grace are in question here, or how the central revelation of Christianity would then be expressed.
Some followers of Aquinas might raise at least four problems in recent ethical studies on virtues. (1) These studies claim to reflect the thought of Thomas Aquinas, but they do not relate their presentation of virtues to Aquinas's theological project. (2) Certain approaches, lacking Thomistic theological principles, seem to be an Aristotelianism joined to some other religious element, e.g., to an Enlightenment view of religion or to a general Calvinism. 
GRACE AS THE SOURCE OF VIRTUES IN AQUINAS
I am not arguing that the recent approaches to virtues are without value in present-day discussion of ethics, but only that some may have overlooked the theological framework, indeed, the revealed and religious source of virtue. Beyond "habit," "virtue," "charity," and "telos" there is much more to the moral theology of Aquinas. And yet, the theology of human life as outlined in the ST is not particularly com-plex. Its pattern runs along these lines. Out of divine wisdom and love the human being is offered a supernatural destiny (incipient in this life and fulfilled in the next); since God endows all beings with the intrinsic capability to reach their goals, a divine "form" is generously given which is the dynamic source of activities such as virtues (one of which is love), and of higher modes of action such as the gifts of the Spirit.
An "Ordo" and Its Nature
Grace names the message, the power, and the goal of the ST whose opening lines (1, q. 1, a. 1) announce a higher ordination, that is, a special plan and destiny for people. This supernatural ordo engages the entire work and each question. The term ordo means not a logical order nor a revelation of commands but a basic orientation vitalizing and directing all that it touches. Ordo, a significant facet in medieval culture, attracted artists and lawyers, theologians and architects. What was more exciting or profound than a realm of beings, or what was more subtle or beautiful than a pattern drawing ideas and sources into a harmonious whole. There is an order of the universe, an order of nature, and an order of grace. It belongs to the professor and the wise person to see and to re-present the orders in the world and in life. The divine plan (predestination) and presence (trinitarian mission) unfold an ordo. Salvation is not religious ideas meriting a paradise or a transitory divine power warding offa devil but a deeper, perduring vitality offered to human life silently. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira observes that Aquinas surrounded human activity with "a luminous crown of relationships. ... Each of the three parts of the ST treats the bearer of these acts, the human person, and the activity of God in people." one being sent, and, on the other hand, a new mode of existence in someone" (1, q. 43, a. 1). These missions-Incarnation in Jesus, and presence and incorporation by Word and Spirit in us-do not just establish a relationship or turn divine contacts on and off but produce a lasting effect in their believing recipients. The empowerment for this order is grace. That grace is not only a new relationship or a divine acceptance but a vital reality in the creature: not a transitory divine help but a principle for people living in and toward a special destiny (1, q. 23, a. 2, ad 4). In the climaxes of the ST 1-2, religious law becomes the grace of the Spirit bestowing a graced anthropology.
Aristotle's thought suggested to Aquinas imaginative ways to describe this new life for human existence, namely, a psychology of form with its multiple activities. In Aristotelian analysis living creatures act out of their forms for their goals, and so natures reveal themselves in actions.
19 When this philosophy is employed in a theology of shared divine life, grace is presented as a principle of various activities and potentialies for action. Grace therefore is an intrinsic, fundamental source and not just an extrinsic force. Otto Hermann Pesch observes:
No student of Aquinas can overlook what a strong accent Thomas placed in treating creation from the perspective that God's own creative activity does not remove the proper activity of creatures but grounds them-and that [grounding] is due to God's greatness.... This illumines the quite differently fashioned structure of thinking which Thomas developed for the description and interpretation of the created character of grace. Grace is not "created" as an independent reality. Rather the "special love" of God must have necessarily a created and creative effect in the human being.
20
Aquinas was uninterested in an expression of salvation that was mainly verbal, paradoxical, or erratic. Since telos determines nature and activity, and since humans have a destiny (revealed in Christ) of faith and mercy, of ministry and resurrection, there must be for hu- mans a "nature" corresponding to the goal. As God enables countless natures to live and procreate, so God equips the human personality to live in the supernatural order. In a passage that contains the theme of this essay Aquinas wrote:
It is not suitable that God would provide more for creatures being led to a natural good by divine love than for those creatures to whom that love offers a supernatural good. For natural creatures God provides generously... forms and powers which are principle of acts so that they are inclined to activity through their own beings. ... Even more for those moved to reach an eternal supernatural good he infuses certain forms or qualities of the supernatural order according to which easily and enthusiastically they are moved by God to attain that good that is eternal. And so the gift of grace is a kind of quality (1-2, q. 110, a. 2).
Quality here describes grace as a stable source of activity. Grace, the new "nature," brings with it coinfused habits and activities (virtues and gifts) that meet and interact with a personality and its acquired virtues. Rejecting the views that grace and infused virtue are the same, or that they exist in utterly different orders, Aquinas wrote: "Grace is located in the first species of quality, although it cannot properly be called a habit because it is not immediately ordained to action but to a kind of spiritual existence which it gives to the soul.... Still there is nothing like grace in the accidents known by the philosophers, for they have examined only those accidents of the soul ordained to acts proportionate to human nature."
21
What is grace according to Aquinas? Because grace is a divine presence, he is reserved in his language and uses a number of admittedly limited terms. Grace is a participation in deeper levels of God's life (1, q. 43, a. 3), but also a "supernatural principle moving one interiorly (2-2, q. 6, a. 1). Grace is a created "quasi-form" of the uncreated, 22 "a kind of supernatural reality in the human being coming from God" (1-2, q. 110, a. 1), a "kind of quality" (1-2, q. 110, a. 2). This under- 21 De Vertíate, q. 27, a. 2, ad 7; further, "grace is in the soul as a kind of form having being complete in itself" (3, q. 63, a. 5, ad 1). Grace is in the first species of quality although properly it cannot be called a habit because it is not immediately ordained to action, and so Aquinas's commentators found a special category for it. On grace as a "quality" distinct from habits, a topic of neo-Scholastic discussion, see Pesch, Thomas von Aquin: Grenze und Grösse mittelaltlicher Theologie (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1988) 241. 22 De Ventate, q. 27, a. 1. "It is therefore necessary that there be given to the human being... something by which human nature itself should be raised to a dignity that would mark such an end suited to it. For this, grace is given ..., a spiritual existence" (ibid. q. 27, a. 2). Aquinas always takes the idea of a divine "accepting" further; the divine action begun in justification ends in love's effect in us. "For God to accept something and to love it (which is the same thing) is nothing other than willing to that one something good. ... Thus a person is said to have grace not only because that one is loved by God unto eternal life but because a reality has been given by God through which one is worthy of eternal life" (ibid. q. 27, a. 1). "Grace, prior to virtue ..., is in the essence of the soul as a subject, participating in divinization" (ST 1-2, q. 110, a. 4) . standing of grace first as a form of Ufe distinguishes him from many theologies of grace from Trent to Vatican II where grace means transitory actual graces. Grace, of course, is not captured in a form, nor is it to be trivialized as merely an adorning quality. A passage from Aquinas that has received considerable attention in recent decades has underscored his shift in theological emphasis from efficient causality to inner life: "Grace is not said to make one graced effectively but formally" (q. Ill, a. 1, ad 1). "Form" and "quality" offer analogical expressions for grace, while "habit" and "disposition" describe virtues. In this theology built upon the system of Aristotle where goal and actionto-goal follow from nature, quality and form affirm a new nature by which men and women act in a higher order, living not as strangers or aliens in the realm of God. If grace is a sharing in something divine, there must be an intrinsic form mediating between the divine and the human; otherwise human beings would be too close to God's being. Thus, in spite of the mechanical and dualist theologies that neoScholasticism produced from the 17th to the 20th centuries, Aquinas's conception kept grace and personality together in intimacy while retaining their necessary distinction.
A supernatural actions and by the creation of an image of God capable of journeying to a special destiny; they are followed by a new "law" where law and religion become grace, and, as a climax, by a theology of grace itself. Thus in the ST 1-2 beneath several modes of powers and actions lie two principles (1-2, q. 49): an Aristotelian psychology, and an extrinsic help, grace. 25 For Aquinas it would be incoherent and unintelligible for God to presume that a created nature could, on its own, live virtuously in the Ufe of the Spirit, or that God would leave the image called to a supernatural realm without the inner means for that life. So two principles are needed for the human journey to the eschaton. They correspond to the two immense gifts from God to us: the gift of being a true cause, and the gift of the Spirit. The ST 1-2 presents these two principles viewed somewhat separately, while the 2-2 treats them together in the active graced personality.
According to an Aristotelian adage, formal, efficient, and final causes are similar. Here that means that the life of grace, the Trinity, and heaven are realizations, infinitely different, of one salvific realm. "Grace and glory are referred to the same genus, because grace is nothing other than a kind of beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not pertain to the same genus" (2-2, q. 24, a. 3; sec 1-2, q. 50, a. 2, ad 2; q. 56, a. 1, ad 3). In Aquinas's theology both human nature and grace are highlighted; neither is subservient to or obscured by the other: "The human person is accordingly said to have the grace of God not only from his being loved by God with a view to eternal life but also from his being given some gift \gratia gratum faciens] by which he is worthy of eternal life.... Similarly God, without any mediating agent, bestows upon us a gratuitous spiritual being, but nevertheless there is the mediation of a created form which is grace."
26 This "spiritual being" is not the transitory actual graces of the later Baroque but a source of life.
Grace and Virtues
After Peter Lombard had linked the three theological virtues with the four cardinal ones, Thomas's teacher, Albert of Cologne, joined a morality of virtues to a theology of grace. Albert's Aristotelian inclinations did not permit him to pursue a psychology where habits or activities were independent of a nature, in this case a human nature. As the soul is prior to its faculties, so is grace prior to the virtues. He 25 "We must now consider that exterior principle of human actions, namely God, as he is the one from whom we are assisted to act rightly through grace" (1-2, q. 109, introduction). Pesch observes: "We cannot grasp the true meaning of Thomas simply by looking up terms in an index of the ST. The decisive motive for introducing the teaching on habits is not to be found in the treatment of the virtues in general or in that on the theological virtues but in the teaching on grace where Aquinas inquires into grace as a 'qualitas* " (Thomas von Aquin 241).
26 De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, and ad 3.
wrote: "In my view, charity is not grace: it is a facet of it like all the other virtues." 27 T. A. Graf concluded: "Albert understood the relationship of grace to the virtues through the analogy of soul and faculties. Grace and soul bestow the first act: being alive. The activity of both is expanded by the powers which proceed from each, e.g., virtues, whose foundation they give."
28
The faculties of the human personality are not substances, and their operating habits, virtues, are given the Aristotelian category of quality. Accidents such as quality cannot subsist on their own; there must exist some subject to bear virtues. In this line of thought, virtuous activities do not come and go easily. A new life with its life-principle (this expression captures the intention of "habit," "form," and "quality") is profoundly-Aquinas would say "essentially"-supernatural.
29
"Just as the natural light of reason is something beyond the acquired virtues which are described in their order to that very natural light, so also is the light of grace which is itself a participation in the divine nature; it is something beyond the infused virtues which are derived from that light and are ordained to that light" (1-2, q. 110, a. 3). Virtuous activity would emerge not first from ethical debate or community discipline but from the new life of the Spirit in us. Faith, for example, is not a higher ethical reasoning but an acceptance of the real realm of grace and an intuition into its ideas and behavior.
What is the relationship of virtues to grace? The analogous pattern attributed to Albert the Great is presumed: to the soul corresponds grace, to its faculties correspond grace's virtues and gifts. "There is a goal prepared by God for human beings exceeding any proportion to human nature, namely eternal life ..., and it is fitting that humans be given something not only to enable activity toward that goal, but that the very nature of the human being be elevated to a dignity and competence toward that goal, and to this grace is given. And just as in natural things the nature is one thing and the inclination of nature is another, and the movement or operation a third, so, in the realm of grace, grace is different from charity and the other virtues." 30 The depth of the human personality can be modified by a variety of habits and virtues. It is a subject that enables diversity-"all the potentiali- 
Which Virtues?
Virtues for Aquinas were never simply habits in the mode of grooved actions; nor were they religious duties attached to pious ideas and sparked by some divine force. Grace and its powers cannot be the same as the acquired natural virtues, for solely natural habits cannot bring a higher life or reach a supernatural destiny; it cannot be the same as the theological virtues because habits necessarily imply a subject. "Grace is not the same as virtue but is a kind of habitude which is presupposed by infused virtues as their principle and root" (q. 109, a. 34 On the distinction and interplay of theological, acquired, and infused moral virtues and acquired virtues (limited but not counterfeit) is to be lead to two insights: first, this issue is a consequence of the more fundamental interplay of the human personality as God's image and of grace; second, as theologians have seen for fifty or two hundred years, an Aristotelian psychology has its limits.
The Form of Virtues
For Aquinas charity was not the same as the Holy Spirit nor a synonym for grace (the opinions of some prior theologians) (2-2, q. 23, a. 2). Charity is one virtue, "the most excellent virtue" (2-2, q. 23, a. 6), but it has a proper activity. Although it has a special relationship to other virtues, it remains one limited form dependent upon a subject and does not have the all-encompassing role of grace. It is not the immediate result of trinitarian presence but emerges from that gift of grace (2-2, q. 24, a. 2). Grace and nature are parallels; charity and nature are not (2-2, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2). 35 Biblical exaltation of charity as the "form" of the virtues does not alter the fact that charity itself is one facet bestowed by the principle of supernatural life. As Aquinas repeated, the organizing form that charity gives is, nonetheless, not the essential quasi-form of grace. infused virtues emerge: it is the herald and coordinator of the many infused virtues. "Just as in natural things, nature itself differs from its motions and operations, so in the things of grace there is a difference between grace, and love and the other virtues." 37 Of course, love is sublime and broad enough to influence other actions, but it does not escape, in Aquinas's theology, being one virtue with a specific activity. Even charity could not lead one to eternal life without a ground that offers prior similarity to the divine source and goal.
38
Aquinas described the formative action of grace in some detail; it lies at an altogether deeper and more extensive level than the influence of charity. In the opening article on the essence of grace he observed that grace is secondarily God's love of men and women, and primarily "a supernatural reality in a human being coming to us from God" (1-2, q. 110, a. 1). With grace as a life principle the activities of charity toward the God of the New Testament in the spirit of its teaching are possible. To give charity dominant roles apart from grace is like describing hands and memories apart from people. Charity is not the motor or organism of virtues but remains on the same level as the other virtues. "Form" has a very clear meaning in Scholastic thought, and nuanced neo-Thomist analyses of how in tenuous analogy a form (charity) could direct another form (another virtue) are available. Direction to a goal is possible only for a nature, a form, and so whatever impetus charity gives to virtues presupposes the prior subject of virtues in the graced personality. If love is the "form" of the virtues, this is not at the price of the rational structure and real diversity among the virtues. Justice, for instance, has its own form, object, and goal. Moreover, the virtues are not solely habits of the will or modes of love but imply and need knowledge and faith. Prudence, the virtue of the practical intellect, is a second directing force, somewhat similar to charity. 
Virtues' Climax
Albert Patfoort sees in the ST 1-2 "three zones of great pneumatological concentration: gifts, the new law, and a treatise on grace."
40
Thomistic virtues have not only a special ground, grace, but climaxes, heightened modes: gifts, beatitudes, fruits of the Spirit (1-2, q. 69; q. 70). In this third level the sphere of activity begun in a particular virtue is intensified by a gift of the Spirit, but again this flows from grace. "It is suitable that there be in the human being higher perfections according to which a person is disposed to being moved by God. And these perfections are called gifts" (1-2, q. 68, a. 1 ). An easy and prompt response to divine inspiration, a meeting between the divine and the human at an instinctual level, the gift is a less deliberative mode of living. Here the struggle of virtue has reached what Aquinas named a "connatural" contact with the realm of God (1-2, q. 68, a. 2 topic, while A. Tanquerey and H. H. Noldin have "some" treatment, and the offerings of his confrère Prümmer is "more complete". 48 He discouraged any separation of Aristotelianism from theology, or virtues from grace. Moral theology is concerned with human acts leading toward God as a supernatural end, and human Ufe is enabled for this and the future life by a supernatural principle of action. 49 Prümmer, the advocate in moral theology of a speculative approach drawing on aspects of spirituality and psychology, arranged his moral theology in a pattern where laws, conscience, and sins come between human acts and virtues, that is, in an order different from that of the ST. 50 If grace, he said, is now treated thoroughly in dogmatic rather than moral theology (because it is embattled by modern heterodox movements), nevertheless aspects of grace must also be treated in moral theology, for morality explores the means (grace and the evangelical law as well as the double rule of law and conscience) through which God enables men and women to reach a supernatural destiny. nius introduced a psychology, the innovative psychology of Aristotle, into theology. The medieval theologian distinguished grace from activities in order to let the personality act but also to give that activity a stability, a personal subjectivity in both the orders of nature and of grace.
2. In the last analysis Aquinas's moral theology is not strictly speaking only an ethics of virtue. The genius of the Summa theologiae was to place the Second Part in dynamic proximity to the great themes of Christianity. 64 Virtues are one set of forces in a broad description of the human image of God living amid various instructive realms {leges) and participating in eschatological life. Aquinas's theology does not begin with human virtues nor does it end with them. It proceeds from two vital sources, the total human personality and divine grace, and it ends in the instinctual gifts of the Spirit. The contemporary value of Aquinas can only be indicated by recognizing a basic distance of him from us. Thomas did not begin with our issues, nor did he take up our theological questions. Admittedly it is important to value the suggestions he gives and to see our connection with the problems he faces. Thomas is certainly an outstanding example of how basic problems of Christian theology, i.e., basic questions of faith and existence, continue on through changing forms of expression. Recognizing their lasting importance, however, and seeing the historical continuity with Thomas doesn't happen without work or without living and thinking in another period. The reward is clear: the experience of an important and graced period in history out of which we come and in which we still live to some extent. This mentality brings also an effective protection against instant, fashionable applications of Aquinas which think that his thought can be presented without its historical roots; and against the opposite presumption that real Christianity only began with our modern age. 
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